Suez 1956: The Crisis That Redrew the Balance of Power

On 26 July 1956, in a speech in Alexandria, President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Within four months Britain, France and Israel had invaded Egypt — and within a few weeks more, under pressure from both superpowers, Britain and France had agreed to leave. The crisis lasted barely half a year. Its consequences shaped the region for decades.

The road to war#

The immediate trigger was financial. In July 1956 the United States, followed by Britain, withdrew its offer to help fund the Aswan High Dam, Nasser’s flagship development project. Nasser responded by seizing the canal, promising that its revenues would pay for the dam.

For the British government of Anthony Eden, the canal was a symbol as much as a waterway: the link to empire, to oil, and to Britain’s status as a world power. Eden came to see Nasser as a new Mussolini. France, for its part, blamed Egyptian support for the rebellion in Algeria. Israel faced cross-border raids and the closure of the Straits of Tiran to its shipping.

Collusion at Sèvres#

In late October 1956, British, French and Israeli representatives met secretly at Sèvres, near Paris. They agreed a plan: Israel would invade Sinai; Britain and France would then issue an ultimatum to both sides to withdraw from the canal zone and, when Egypt refused, intervene to “separate the combatants” and seize the canal.

The plan unfolded as agreed. Israel attacked on 29 October. The Anglo-French ultimatum followed the next day, and air strikes on Egypt began on 31 October. British and French paratroops and seaborne forces landed at Port Said and Port Fuad on 5 and 6 November.

The collapse#

Militarily the operation was advancing. Politically it was collapsing. The most important opposition came not from Moscow but from Washington. President Eisenhower, furious at not having been consulted and determined not to be associated with colonial adventures, applied decisive economic pressure. As sterling came under heavy selling, the United States made clear it would not support Britain’s requests for emergency financing until British forces withdrew.

The Soviet Union, simultaneously crushing the uprising in Hungary, issued threatening notes to London, Paris and Tel Aviv. At the United Nations, the General Assembly demanded a ceasefire and approved the creation of the UN Emergency Force — the first armed UN peacekeeping force — to supervise the withdrawal.

Britain accepted a ceasefire at midnight on 6 November. The last Anglo-French troops left Port Said before Christmas; Israel withdrew from Sinai by March 1957. Anthony Eden resigned in January 1957.

Suez did not create the new balance of power in the Middle East. It revealed it.

Consequences#

The crisis had several lasting effects:

1. The end of Anglo-French primacy. Britain and France could no longer act in the region against the wishes of the United States. Britain’s remaining positions east of Suez would be managed, and eventually abandoned, within this new reality.
2. The rise of Nasser. Militarily defeated, Nasser emerged politically triumphant — the hero of Arab nationalism, whose influence would dominate regional politics until 1967.
3. The superpowers move in. The Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957 signalled a more direct American role in the region, while the Soviet Union deepened its ties with Egypt and Syria.
4. A precedent for peacekeeping. The UN Emergency Force became the model for decades of UN peace operations.

Why Suez still matters#

Suez is often remembered as a British humiliation, but its broader lesson concerns the relationship between military capability and political legitimacy. The invading powers could win battles; they could not sustain a war that their most important ally opposed and that much of the world regarded as illegitimate. That lesson — about the limits of force and the importance of financial and diplomatic power — has been rediscovered by other powers in the Middle East ever since.